Efficient and Secure Flash-based Gaming CAPTCH by Aldwairi, Monther et al.
Efficient and Secure Flash-based Gaming CAPTCHA
Monther Aldwairia,b,∗, Suaad Mohammeda, Megana Lakshmi
Padmanabhana
aCollege of Technological Innovation, P.O. Box 144534, Zayed University, Abu Dhabi,
United Arab Emirates
b Computer and Information Technology Faculty, P.O. Box 3030, Jordan University of
Science and Technology, Irbid 22110, Jordan
Abstract
With the growth of connectivity to smart grids, new applications, and the
changing interaction between customer and energy clouds, clouds are more
vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks. Efficient detection methods are re-
quired to authenticate, detect and control attackers. Completely Automated
Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart, CAPTCHA, is one
efficient tool to thwart denial of service attacks. The server presents the user
with a client puzzle to solve in order to gain access to the service or website.
The puzzle should be hard enough for computers, but easy for humans to
solve. Several methods have been suggested including the popular image-
based, as well as video-based, and text-based CAPTCHAs. In this paper,
we present a new Flash-based gaming CAPTCHA to differentiate bots from
humans. We propose a drag and drop client puzzle where the user will play
a simple game to answer a visual question. Our method turns out to be con-
venient, easy for users and challenging for bots. Additionally, it has gaming
aspect, which makes it interesting to users of all age groups.
Keywords: Energy Cloud, Client Puzzles, Flash CAPTCHA, Gaming
CAPTCHA, Turing Test
1. Introduction
Smart grids and associated energy clouds are supposed to provide cheaper
power management and easier peer to peer transactions [1]. However, se-
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curity has been a major concern specially when dealing with energy cloud
infrastructure. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks have been identified as one
of the most important potential threats to cloud-based energy management
[2]. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) was deemed high impact attack
on smart grids that might result in communication failure preventing urgent
signals that could put the smart gird at risk [3]. Asri et al. [4] proved through
realistic simulation that DDoS is a very dangerous threat to the smart grid
ecosystems.
Denial of service against cloud of energy is usually perpetrated through Bots
or automated scripts [5]. Bots are one of the major concerns for many com-
munication networks, because of their ability to send large number of re-
quests to servers or clouds. In addition, they can be used for manipulation of
online surveys, review and polls, including the results of elections [6]. There-
fore, several efforts have been made to identify human users from automated
programs or bots. In 1950, the researcher Alan Turing hypothesized that
machines could pose as humans. To prove that, he designed a test where an
evaluator could tell human from machine based on simple questions. The
evaluator had to evaluate the answers from both respondents and decide
which is human. Failure to do so proved that machines could pose as human
[7].
In 1997, Anderi Broder came up with the idea of using a puzzle to dis-
tinguish between bots and human users [8]. In 2000, Yahoo! approached
Carnegie-Mellon University and described their chat-room problem, where
bots would pose as human and get information from users [9]. Luis et al.
started setting some criteria for a test that can be used to tell computers
and human apart. This is when the term CAPTCHA (Completely Auto-
mated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Human Apart) came about.
For a test to be considered a CAPTCHA, the code and the data must be
publicly available. The idea was to have a test that will prevent bots from
gaining access to services even if all people know what the code is and how
the CAPTCHA works [10]. Besides preventing automated machines from
registering to websites, CAPTCHA is effective in slowing DoS, spam email,
and password brute force attacks [11].
The earliest puzzles from the 2000 CAPTCHA project started with using
distorted texts. Later researchers have classified CAPTCHA methods into
three classes: OCR-based, visual non-OCR-based and non-visual [12]. The
OCR-based method uses the shortcomings of the Optical Character Recog-
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nition (OCR) system to make it harder for automatic computer programs to
read the CAPTCHA. Visual non-OCR-based methods use computer systems
deficiency in identifying types of objects within images. Non-visual use other
forms of CAPTCHA such as audio.
Another classification of CAPTCHA made by researchers was text-based,
sound-based and image-based schemes [13]. The text-based is the same as
the earlier OCR-based method, where the text is distorted and rendered
unreadable to bots. Sound-based schemes fit in the area of the non-visual
method, and image-based scheme corresponds to the visual non-OCR method
of the grouping done by Mohammad and Sajjad [12].
Most modern CAPTCHAs are either solvable by machines, difficult for users,
require technical resources, processing power or other requirements. In this
paper, we proposed a new CAPTCHA technique: Flash-based gaming CAPTCHA,
which requires fewer resources, easier for all users to solve, but still difficult
for machines to pass. In order to evaluate the proposed CAPTCHA, the
framework developed by Jakob Nielson [14] was used. The learnability, effi-
ciency, memorability, errors, and user satisfaction were measured. In addi-
tion, known attacks and technical requirements were added to the evaluation
criteria.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 surveys the related
work. Section 3 describes the proposed method while the evaluation and
results are described in section 4.
2. Related Work
We follow the categorization by Mohammad and Sajjad [12] and present
OCR-based, visual non-OCR-based and non-visual methods.
2.1. OCR-Based Methodsk
OCR-based/text-based CAPTCHA has been used mostly by websites
such as Google, Microsoft, TicketMaster, Yahoo, eBay, PayPal and many
other major websites. Gimpy is one of the first CAPTCHAs developed by
researchers at Carnegie Mellon University. The website implementing this
method picks seven words from a dictionary and then slightly distorts them
in a way that is readable by a human but not by machines. The test is then
presented to the user who is asked to type in three of the words presented
[10] as shown in Figure 1.a. Ling-Zi and Yi-Chun [15] studied a login form
of a popular Chinese bank website and pointed out vulnerabilities. They
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demonstrate how easy text-based CAPTCHA can be defeated with simple
tools. They concluded that without appropriate design, CAPTCHAs imple-
mentation can be complicated and risky. The authors provided some key
points for CAPTCHA designers to improve the security implementation of
the text-based CAPTCHA and build a robust CAPTCHA scheme [16].
Figure 1.b. shows another method called EZGimpy, where the program dis-
torts the text by adding line, different colors and noises to the background
to make it harder for machines to read [17]. Mori and Malik [18] developed a
method where they identified three words of the Gimpy method with a 33%
success rate, and successfully solved the EZGimpy CAPTCHA 92% of the
time.
ScatterType [19] in Figure 1.c. is another type of OCR-Based CAPTCHA,
where the letters are scattered horizontally and vertically, making it harder
for the machines to read. The legibility of the words depends on horizontal
and vertical scatter distances, and the letters used.
Figure 1.d. shows Pessimal prints. It uses low-quality images that are syn-
thetically generated by machines as a way to identify human user [9]. The
difficulty for OCR machines to read the words depends on the blur and
threshold factors; the lower the numbers are the harder it is for machines to
read the words.
2.2. Visual Non-OCR-Based Methods
Difficulties associated with computer vision systems are used in these
types of CAPTCHAs to identify and recognize objects in the image. Some
examples of Visual non-OCR-based methods (image-based methods) include
online collage and PIX. The ESP/PIX is among the first visual-non-OCR
methods developed by Carnegie Mellon University. The program relies on a
database that has a large number of concrete objects such as cats, flowers,
cars, houses, horses etc. The program randomly picks an object and then
randomly selects four images of that object. The images are then randomly
distorted and presented to the users. From a drop-down menu, the users are
expected to answer the question: what are these pictures of? [20]. Figure 2.a
below presents an example of ESP/PIX CAPTCHA. Kulluru et al. [21] high-
lighted weaknesses of ESP Pix CAPTCHA. The first weakness is language
dependency as it is available only English. Sometimes image recognition be-
comes awkward due to ambiguity present in objects picture and it is also
posing a big challenge low vision and visually impaired users.
Collage CAPTCHA is another example, where a bank of generic words is
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Figure 1: Examples of OCR-Based CAPTCHAs
prepared. Such words include car, cat, fruit, flower, house, and airplane.
The program randomly chooses a few words from the list of words and then
searches the database for those pictures. The selected pictures are rotated a
little and randomly located in the display space where they do not overlap.
The computer then chooses a word and asks the user to select the responding
picture. If the answer is correct, the computer assumes that the user is a
human [22]. Figure 2.b. shows an example of this method. Later Shanker
et al. [23] proposed hybrid collage CAPTCHA to make it more difficult and
resistant to hacker attacks. High usability and response time were achieved
in hybrid college CAPTCHA as compared to collage CAPTCHA.
Mohammad and Sajad implemented a Drawing CAPTCHA using a Java
Applet inserted in a webpage that can run easily on any website to achieve se-
curity against DoS attacks. Asirra standing for Animal Species Image Recog-
nition for Restricting Access [24] was a common image-based CAPTCHA in-
troduced by Microsoft in 2007. It displays 12 images for both cats and dogs,
and then asks the user to identify cats images and select them. This task
can be easily accomplished by human and may be challenging for machines.
DeepCAPTCHA is another approach that has been proposed by Nejati et al.
in 2014 [25]. The framework analyzes the 3D models of real-world objects,
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Figure 2: Examples of Visual-non-OCR CAPTCHAs
processes them so that machine cannot recognize the objects, and presents
them to the user to sort based on their relative size. The authors believe
machines cannot solve DeepCAPTCHA while user can easily solve it by us-
ing their reliable object recognition ability. The experimental results of their
framework showed that individuals solved the DeepCAPTCHA with a high
accuracy of 84%.
2.3. Non-Visual Methods
Question-based CAPTCHAs are an example of non-visual CAPTCHA.
These are methods where the user answers a specific question that needs
reasoning [8]. Figure 3.a. presents an example of question-based CAPTCHA
where the user needs to identify stationary objects and add their counts.
Another example is math-question-based CAPTCHA, often called QRBGS
CAPTCHA [26]. Some CAPTCHAs that have been used are too easy while
others are difficult for many users to solve such as the complicated math in
Figure 3.b. These methods use very few numbers of patterns therefore, can
be easily solved by a designed automatic solver [27].
2.4. Energy Clouds Security
While many researchers focused on the energy cloud optimization in terms
of cost, stability, adaptability and sustainability, we believe security should
not be overlooked [28]. With massive custom network-of-networks energy
6
Figure 3: Examples of Non-visual CAPTCHAs
clouds proposed, such as Cloud-SEnergy’s [5], that requires deployment of
mission critical IoT devices, denial of service attack jumps to the forefront
of the threat landscape [29]. While emerging research efforts focused on
anomaly detection of DDoS in computing environments, CAPTCHA remains
one of the most efficient low overhead techniques to curb DDoS campaigns
[30].
Due to security concerns about existing CAPTCHAs surveyed earlier, the
area has gained a lot of researchers attention. Some suggested alternative
text-based, images, while others suggested using audio and video techniques
[31]. However, these traditional methods are not safe anymore. For example,
text-based CAPTCHA was the most used method in the last decade, but
it is vulnerable to dictionary attacks, the existence of segmentation software
and more [32]. While audio-based CAPTCHA can be easily attacked by bots
with voice recognition, and the ability to distinguish between the pronunci-
ation of words and the volume of noise [33]. Video-based CAPTCHA can
be easily attacked because of the ability of software to extract images from
the video and analyze them to solve the challenge. Moreover, audio and
video-based CAPTCHAs are not preferred by network applications because
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of their excessive consumption of bandwidth and time [34].
3. Flash-based Gaming CAPTCHA
We propose Flash-based gaming CAPTCHA as a way to tell users and
machines apart. The idea is to present a simple and intuitive game for the
user to play. A dataset of simple games requiring human experience will be
designed and the website will randomly select a CAPTCHA game to present
to the user. To solve this CAPTCHA, the user must identify the object
and figure out the required action or question to be answered. Figure 4.a
shows an example of the proposed CAPTCHA, in which user is expected
to drag and drop the correct ball into the net. In this particular example
the required object is the soccer ball and the action is to drag the ball into
the goal net. After successfully solving the CAPTCHA, the user is allowed
to access the required service. However, if the CAPTCHA is not solved
correctly, the website displays an error message, and then the CAPTCHA is
refreshed with a random one from the database. Figures 4.b and 4.c show
examples of a successful and failed attempts, respectively.
Figure 4: Flash-Based Gaming CAPTCHA
The processing of proposed CAPTCHA is depicted by Algorithm 1. The
user’s mouse coordinates are collected on mouse press and release, and used to
determine that he dragged the correct ball into the goal post. The proposed
method is more secure and remains easy and fun for humans compared to
traditional visual-based CAPTCHAs. It does not only require pattern or
object recognition, but also commonsense knowledge and prior experience to
perform the required action.
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Algorithm 1 Flash-based Gaming CAPTCHA
Input: xy= mouse coordinates, zn= goalPostCoords
Output: result
1: function VerifyGoal
2: (x, y) ← mouseCoordinates()
3: . % mouse click and hold signal is received%
4: if x, y /∈ SoccerBallCoord then
5: result← wrong
6: else
7: . %mouse left release signal is received%
8: if x, y ∈ goalPostCoords then
9: result← correct
10: else
11: result← wrong
12: end if
13: end if
14: end function
4. Evaluation and Results
A user experience is carried out to evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed CAPTCHA in terms of average time to solve, accuracy and ease of
use by real users. We build a website to test Flash CAPTCHA implemen-
tation and capture the users reaction with a carefully designed survey. The
survey asks the user to provide the following information before answering
the CAPTCHA challenge.
1. Age.
2. Gender.
3. Education level.
4. Years using the Internet.
5. Frequency of Internet use.
6. Vision problems.
Online CAPTCHA was implemented and graduate students were sur-
veyed after they finished solving the game. The survey data was collected
using convenience sampling, which is based on a non-random sample. That
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is the results cannot be extrapolated to other than the participating sample.
A total of 50 users participated in the experiment with 50% male and 50%
female. The survey measures the users Internet surfing experience by ask-
ing about the years of using the Internet. Frequency of Internet use: daily,
weekly or monthly. The results in Table 1, show that the average years of
using the Internet for the 50 participants was 9.56 years with a range of 1-21
years, with the majority of the sample being aware of at least one type of
CAPTCHA. Moreover, 68% of the participants are using the Internet on a
daily basis, 18% of the participants are using Internet on a weekly basis and
14% of the participants are using Internet on a monthly basis.
Table 1: Participants Internet Experience (Years)
Years of Using the Internet 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-21
Number of Participants 18 13 10 9
The CAPTCHA code measures the average time required to solve the
challenge. The time was measured using Action Script function getTimer()
as the difference of time between displaying the game and releasing the ball.
Figure 5 shows the average time for users with varying Internet experience,
the overall average time was 9.5 seconds. The figure shows that the average
time required to solve CAPTCHA is not correlated to the users Internet
usage and skills. The users who use the Internet on monthly basis were
able to solve the challenge faster that users who use the Internet on weekly
basis with 10.8 seconds. This proves that even users with low Internet and
computing skills can easily understand and solve the challenge presented by
the new CAPTCHA.
To be able to determine the ease of use of Flash-based CAPTCHA, par-
ticipants of different ages and education levels were surveyed. The sample
contains 50% male and 50% female, with ages ranging between 8 and 48,
and the average age of 21.7 years. The participants education level varies as
shown by Figure 6, where 22% are primary level, 6% are preparatory level,
16% are secondary level, 8% are iploma level, 32% are Bachelor level, 14% are
Master level and 2% had their Ph.D. This diverse sample was very important
to identify how the age and different education levels may affect solving the
CAPTCHA.
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Figure 5: Average Time Required to Solve the CAPTCHA
Figure 6: Participants Educational Level
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Furthermore, the participants vision issues were very important because
we are using a Flash-based CAPTCHA. Seventy two percent of the partic-
ipants did not have any vision impairments while 28% have vision issues
including nearsightedness and farsightedness. Figure 7 shows the number of
failed attempts for each participants who had a vision impairments was 0,
which means all of them were able to answer the CAPTCHA correctly. This
supports that Flash-based CAPTCHA can be easily solved by users with
vision impairment.
Figure 7: Visual Impairments Effects on Success and Failures
5. Comparison to Related Work
The Flash-based CAPTCHA user preference was compared to six well-
known CAPTCHAs in the literature including: Gimpy, ScatterType, Pessi-
mal Prints, Collage, Math-based (QRBGS), and question-based. In addition,
we identify and discuss the weaknesses of each CAPTCHA in terms of tech-
nical requirements, easiness to bypass by bots and any known attacks against
them. To do so, we use the framework developed by Jakob Nielson [14]. The
CAPTCHAs were analyzed, from users points of view, using the following
metrics.
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1. Learnability: How easy is it for users to solve the CAPTCHA the first-
time users are presented with it?
2. Efficiency: Once users are familiar with the design, how quickly they
can solve the CAPTCHA?
3. Memorability: After not using this CAPTCHA for a while, how long
will it take users to solve a similar CAPTCHA?
4. Satisfaction: How pleasant is it to use the CAPTCHA?
5. Errors: How many failed attempts did users make before solving the
CAPTCHA?
The survey used five-point Likert scale and answers ranging from 1 (very
difficult), 2 (difficult), 3 (normal), to 4 (easy), and 5 (very easy). In order to
make the analysis more convenient, we combine the scores 1 (very difficult)
and 2 (difficult) together, 4 (easy) and 5 (very easy) together. In doing this,
we obtain 2 charts comparing the level of easiness and the level of difficulty
of the CAPTCHAs. The final results of the study for easiness are shown by
Figure 8. The figure shows a summary of the most preferred CAPTCHAs
according to the users.
Figure 8: Users Preference
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5.1. Users Preference
According to the survey analysis, the Flash-based CAPTCHA is easiest
and fastest to solve, easiest to remember and most pleasant to use. The
subsections below explain how the users rated them according to their learn-
ability, efficiency, memorability, and satisfaction.
5.1.1. Learnability
With regards to learnability, 97.78% of the respondents said that Flash-
based CAPTCHA is the easiest to solve, 80% of the respondents thought
that Collage CAPTCHA is easy to solve, while the third easiest CAPTCHA
to solve was the Question-based CAPTCHA with 60% and then the Gimpy
Captcha with 51.11%. The Pessimal CAPTCHA, Scatter Type CAPTCHA
and Math CAPTCHA scored of 44.44%, 26.67% and 20%, respectively.
5.1.2. Efficiency
Taking the efficiency into consideration, 95.56% of the respondents felt
that the Flash-based CAPTCHA took the least time to solve, while 75.55%
of the respondents said that Collage CAPTCHA took less time to solve.
Question-based, Gimpy, Pessimal, ScatterType CAPTCHAs came in next
with 68.89%, 64.44%, 46.66% and 35.55%, respectively. Only 15.56% of the
respondents felt the Math-Based CAPTCHA took the least time to solve.
5.1.3. Memorability
For memorability, 95.56% of the respondents thought that Flash-based
CAPTCHA is the easiest to remember and solve after a while of not using
it, which is the highest percentage among all CAPTCHAs. The second in
line with regards to memorability was the Collage CAPTCHA with 71.11%,
and then Question-based CAPTCHA with 65.91%. The Pessimal, GIMPY,
ScatterType and Math-based CAPTCHAs came in last with 44.44%, 37.78%,
28.89%, and 22.22%, respectively.
5.1.4. Satisfaction
A percentage of 91.11 of users felt the Flash-Based CAPTCHA was the
most pleasant to use while 66.67% said that Collage-based CAPTCHA was
the most pleasant. Tthird in line was the Question-based CAPTCHA with
65.91% followed by the Gimpy CAPTCHA with 35.56%. Pessimal, Scatter-
Type, and Math-based CAPTCHAs had 33.33%, 20% and 13.33% respec-
tively.
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5.2. Difficulty
We compare the seven CAPTCHAs in terms of difficulty to solve by
the users. Figure 9 provides the user’s opinions on the most inconvenient
CAPTCHA with regards to learnability, efficiency, memorability and satis-
faction.
Figure 9: CAPTCHAs Difficulty
5.2.1. Learnability
Math-based CAPTCHA was the most difficult to use with 73.33% of re-
spondents, followed by Pessimal CAPTCHA with 37.78% of the respondents
finding it difficult to use. ScatterType, Gimpy, Question-based, Collage-
based CAPTCHAs had the following percentages finding them difficult: 35.55%,
24.44%, 8.89% and 6.6%, respectively. Finally, only 2.22% of the respondents
found the Flash-based CAPTCHA to be difficult.
5.2.2. Efficiency
The Math-based CAPTCHA was the most inefficient with 73.33% fol-
lowed by the Pessimal with 37.78%, ScatterType with 28.89% and Gimpy
15
with 11.11% of the respondents taking more time to solve them. Question-
based, Flash-based, and Collage-based CAPTCHAs took comparatively less
time from the users with 8.89%, 2.22% and 0%, respectively.
5.2.3. Memorability
Math-based CAPTCHA was the most difficult to remember how to solve
for 66.67% of participants after a long-time of non use. ScatterType CAPTCHA
came in second with 40% then Pessimal, Gimpy, Question-based and the
Collage-based CAPTCHAs were found difficult to remember after a while
by 37.78%, 35.55%, 13.33% and 11.11% of the respondents. Flash-based
CAPTCHA was the difficult to remember only for 2.22% of respondents.
5.2.4. Satisfaction
Math-based CAPTCHA was found unpleasant by 75.56% of the respon-
dents and the ScatterType CAPTCHA was unpleasant by 48.89% of the re-
spondents. Pessimal, Gimpy, Question-based, and Collage-based CAPTCHAs
were found unpleasant by 46.67%, 33.33%, 18.18% and 8.89% of the respon-
dents, respectively. Only 2.22% of the users found Flash-based CAPTCHA
to be unpleasant.
5.3. Failure to Solve
According to the survey, the number of failed attempts varied from 1
to 64. Figure 10 shows the number of failed attempts given by the re-
spondents for every CAPTCHA. The analysis shows that there have been
at least 64 failed attempts to solve the Pessimal CAPTCHA, and at least
54 failed attempts to solve the ScatterType CAPTCHA. In the Pessimal
CAPTCHA and ScatterType CAPTCHA the words are distorted and cer-
tain letters and numerals look alike such as i, l and 1... etc. Question-
based and GIMPY CAPTCHAs had 35, and 34 failed attempts, respectively.
Question-based CAPTCHA included pictures, which are small in size and
difficult for the users to identify what is in the picture. At the same time,
in a Gimpy CAPTCHA the texts are overwritten, which makes it disturb-
ing for a user to view and type the text. Moreover, Six failed attempts to
solve the collage CAPTCHA stemmed from unclear pictures. Finally, Flash-
based CAPTCHA had the least number of wrong attempts of one. That is
attributed to the fact the users find the CAPTCHA more interesting and
clear. The math CAPTCHA is not considered in this analysis due to the
16
fact that over 93% of the respondents either did not answer the question or
got it wrong.
Figure 10: Number of Failed Attempts
5.4. technical requirement
The technical requirement is one of the main drawbacks for the CAPTCHAs.
GIMPY, ScatterType, Pessimal, Collage, Question-based and the math-
based CAPTCHAs require a bank of images, and a dictionary for these
CAPTCHAs to work. However, Flash-based CAPTCHA requires a swf file
per game, which is smaller in size than banks of images. In addition, it does
not require a huge dictionary; therefore, the flash-based CAPTCHA requires
fewer resources than the existing CAPTCHAs.
5.5. Resistance to Known Attacks
Each one the aforementioned CAPTCHAs suffer from well-known attacks.
An algorithm has been developed for passing a GIMPY CAPTCHA. The
algorithm has a success rate of 33% in identifying three words from the
GIMPY CAPTCHA, rendering it insecure.
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The strength of Pessimal CAPTCHA against automated attacks depends
on the blur and threshold factors; the lower the numbers the harder it is
for machines to read the words [9]. However, it was shown in the survey
that this CAPTCHA had the highest number of wrong attempts and only
44.44% learnability. Therefore, the CAPTCHAs that are used in websites
need to have higher blur and threshold factors for them to be easily answered
by a human, which will make it prone to attacks by machines. Therefore,
Pessimal CAPTCHA is not the best CAPTCHA to be used to defend against
automated attacks.
There are some algorithms that can successfully solve advanced math
problems and therefore bypass Math-based CAPTCHAs [26]. However, math-
based CAPTCHA is found to be the most difficult CAPTCHA for users to
solve with only a success rate of less than 7%.
The readability of ScatterType CAPTCHA depends on the scatter dis-
tance: the lower the distance the more readable the CAPTCHA is. With
a scatter distance of 0.15, only 27.78% of the respondents stated that this
CAPTCHA is easy. Therefore, the scatter distance has to be lower in order
for a higher percentage of users to be able to read it. However, closer letter
and lower scatter distance means that this CAPTCHA is subject to OCR
attacks [19].
Hacking Collage CAPTCHA depends on computer-vision recognition sys-
tems. When a machine comes across a picture it will search its own table
to check if it came across the picture before. If yes the bot will look for the
answer and if not it will save the picture into its system for later reference.
A random guess can lead to about 17% attack success rate. But the failure
to solve remains high and makes it less than ideal CAPTCHA to deploy for
users.
For the Question-based CAPTCHA, a few wrong attempts are good
enough for an automated machine to identify the answer for the respective
CAPTCHAs. Bots save the pictures they detect into their database. When
they come across the same image, it can review the previous responses given
for that image.
Optical Character Recognition based attack does not work on a Flash-
based CAPTCHA, this is because OCR is used by automated machines to
identify characters and not images or Flash files. The CAPTCHA does not
have a question and requires the cognitive thinking of a human to deduct
what is required to be done. This makes it more resistant to known attacks.
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5.6. Complexity Analysis
At first glance the presented client puzzle seems trivial, just put the proper
ball into the goal net. This is simple for humans to do, but requires a Bot to
have sophisticated levels of artificial intelligence and image processing. When
it comes to brute forcing the game, we can easily make this simple scenario
more complicated by adding different types of nets. Perhaps a score board
would be introduced and the client is asked to even up the scores by dragging
the ball to the proper team’s goal net. It is quite difficult to come up with
a complexity analysis for this scenario, because playing a game (football) is
much more complex than throwing a dice.
6. Conclusions
This paper proposed implemented and evaluated a new type of CAPTCHA:
Flash-based CAPTCHA. According to the survey results, this CAPTCHA
was the most convenient to use since it was voted the easiest to solve, with the
least number of failures. In addition, it was found to be the fastest, the most
pleasant to solve, and the easiest to remember after not using it for a long
while. Moreover, Flash-based CAPTCHA needs fewer resources compared
to the existing CAPTCHAs, making it more efficient for use. Flash-based
CAPTCHA is resistant to OCR attacks since this attack targets text-based
CAPTCHAs, and the fact that this CAPTCHA needs cognitive abilities to
solve, which makes it more resistant to automated attacks. Moreover, users
from different age groups, levels of education, Internet skills and even those
with vision impairments were able to solve it easily.
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